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Changes in welfare legislation throughout the 1990s attempted, among other things, to
promote marriage and decrease single parenthood. However, little research considers how
such policies inﬂuence children’s living arrangements. This article uses data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation to relate welfare reform policies to the
likelihood that children live in one of three living arrangements: with married parents,
with a single parent, or with a parent and another adult. Unlike previous work, the study
differentiates the ways in which various types of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) policies, such as time limits, sanctions, and income disregards, predict children’s
living arrangements. Overall, results show very few robust associations between welfare
policies and children’s living arrangements.
In 1996, Congress passed and President William Clinton signed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA; U.S. Public Law 104-193), which abolished the Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and established instead
a system of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The leg-
islation explicitly promoted work and marriage, identifying the reduc-
tion of single parenthood as a key goal. The assumption was that re-
sulting changes would beneﬁt children.
In actuality, even before the 1996 PRWORA legislation, the federal352 Social Service Review
government gave states extensive leeway to opt out of AFDC system
requirements and to develop their own welfare policies. Many of these
state policies were precursors to TANF; among them were work require-
ments, stringent child support enforcement provisions, and rules that
increased the eligibility of married-couple families for cash assistance.
Most of these changes occurred during the early and mid-1990s. By
1996, 27 states implemented a major welfare waiver of some kind (re-
viewed in Schoeni and Blank 2000), though the welfare requirements
speciﬁed by these waivers varied greatly across states.
During congressional debate over the 1996 legislation, much of the
rhetoric focused on the need to reduce single parenthood and increase
marriage, but most of the policies implemented by states during the
1990s focused instead on increasing employment and decreasing welfare
use (some policy exceptions include the implementation of the family
cap and efforts to expand public assistance eligibility for married cou-
ples, described below). As described further below, changes in welfare
policies could inﬂuence living arrangements both directly and indirectly.
This article thus examines whether the welfare changes that occurred
during the 1990s, both before and after the implementation of TANF,
are associated with children’s living arrangements. It uses data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the years
1992–99.
1
Living Arrangements and Child Well Being
A considerable body of research examines whether living with a single
parent is detrimental for children. In general, this research suggests
that such children, on average, fare worse than those living with married
parents; they have a greater number of behavior problems, higher rates
of teenage pregnancy, and lower levels of academic achievement
(McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). The inﬂuence of living with a single
parent also appears to extend into adulthood. For example, a recent
study ﬁnds that men who grow up in father-absent households have
higher rates of incarceration than men who grow up living with both
biological parents (Harper and McLanahan 2004). Research by Sara
McLanahan and Gary Sandefur (1994) ﬁnds that living with a single
parent is also associated with unemployment and public assistance use
in adulthood.
However, there is some evidence that single parenthood may not be
associated with reduced well being for minority children or those in
low-income families. For example, one study ﬁnds that duration of time
spent living with a single mother is associated with reductions in test
scores and delinquency among white children but not African American
children (Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones 2002). Another study, which
examines a sample of low-income children, ﬁnds very few associationsWelfare and Children 353
between living arrangements and child development (Foster and Kalil
2007). Finally, various other studies ﬁnd that, after controlling for an
extensive range of maternal and child characteristics, the outcomes of
children in single-parent families do not differ to a statistically signiﬁcant
degree from those of children in married-parent families (Carlson and
Corcoran 2001; Ginther and Pollak 2004; Gennetian 2005; Foster and
Kalil 2007). In sum, although most researchers agree that living ar-
rangements are linked to children’s outcomes, some evidence suggests
that this link may not be as strong as originally thought.
How Might State Policy Choices Inﬂuence Children’s
Living Arrangements?
There are several routes through which changes in welfare policies may
inﬂuence children’s living arrangements. Welfare reform is likely to have
direct effects on welfare use (actual or anticipated), welfare payments,
employment, and income. These changes in employment and ﬁnancial
resources may, in turn, inﬂuence children’s living arrangements in var-
ious ways. Direct incentives to marry also may prompt changes in living
arrangements. Although this study does not examine women’s child-
bearing decisions, it is possible that welfare reform could inﬂuence
the decision to have children as well as the relationship context in
which a birth occurs.
Several scholars have elucidated the pathways through which welfare
policy changes could inﬂuence children’s living arrangements (Peters,
Plotnick, and Jeong 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005). If the attractiveness
of welfare declines due to reductions in beneﬁts or increases in the
strictness of work rules and enforcements, marriage (as well as cohab-
itation or living with other adults) could increase, because mothers may
feel the need to turn elsewhere for the ﬁnancial support they no longer
can or want to obtain from the welfare system. In other words, women
may ﬁnd a substitute for welfare in marriage or doubling up with other
adults. If changes in welfare policies increase the accessibility of welfare
to married parents, a previously existing barrier to marriage is removed,
and marriage rates may rise. Welfare policies also may promote increases
in earnings or income by increasing the amount of earnings that women
can keep or by pushing women into the labor market. These behavioral
changes could lead to an increase in marriage if, due to their improved
ﬁnancial status, women become more attractive spouses. Additionally,
existing marriages may be less likely to dissolve if improved ﬁnancial
situations diminish strain within a relationship. However, if a woman’s
ﬁnancial position improves, her chances of marriage and cohabitation
may decrease, as she may use her ﬁnancial independence to live on her
own.354 Social Service Review
This article examines six types of welfare policies that changed during
the 1990s and that may indirectly or directly affect living arrangements:
time limits, sanctions, income disregards, paternity establishment, eli-
gibility of married couples for welfare, and family caps. These policy
measures represent only some of the many choices available to states
but are consistent with the key policy variables examined by other re-
searchers as well as with those most likely to inﬂuence living arrange-
ments (Grogger and Karoly 2005). The discussion below describes each
policy change and outlines how it may inﬂuence living arrangements.
Time Limits
One of the most dramatic changes in welfare policy in the 1990s was
the imposition of time limits on the receipt of public assistance. During
the mid-1990s, waivers from the federal government allowed several
states to limit the amount of time recipients could receive cash assis-
tance. The 1996 legislation included a 5-year maximum lifetime limit
on the receipt of federally funded welfare beneﬁts. State variation still
persists, because some states chose to use their own funds to avoid
imposing time limits. Other states set time limits that are even stricter
than those established by the federal guidelines.
In general, time limits are likely to decrease welfare use and increase
employment but to have ambiguous effects on total household income
(Grogger and Karoly 2005). These changes, in turn, could inﬂuence
living arrangements in the ways noted above. It is important to note
that this study only includes data through 1999 and thus covers a period
before many families reached the federal (and perhaps the state) time
limits. However, some research indicates that time limits inﬂuence re-
cipients’ behavior well before they are imposed because they indicate
to recipients that welfare will not continue indeﬁnitely. One study ﬁnds
that recipients leave welfare for employment before the limit is reached,
departing from the rolls in order to retain some welfare eligibility for
a later date (Grogger and Michalopoulos 2004). Strict time limits may
also lead women to marry or double up in order to buffer against future
losses of welfare support.
Sanctions
In the years before PRWORA, 21 states received federal waivers allowing
them to reduce or eliminate beneﬁts for welfare participants who did
not meet the work requirements of the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills
Program (JOBS, a pre-TANF welfare-to-work program; Grogger and
Karoly 2005). Under PRWORA, welfare recipients must participate in
work or work-related activities in order to receive public assistance, and
states use sanctions to enforce this policy. Although sanctions are part
of the PRWORA legislation, there is variation in the severity of theWelfare and Children 355
sanctions imposed by states. Sanctions range from partial- to full-beneﬁt
reductions of welfare beneﬁts. Sanctions may indirectly affect family
arrangements, as they are likely to decrease welfare use, increase em-
ployment, and have an ambiguous effect on total income (Grogger and
Karoly 2005).
Income Disregards
Under AFDC, all recipients who worked were entitled to exclude as a
work expense the ﬁrst $90 of their earnings when calculating their
beneﬁt levels. This exclusion, which effectively raised earnings while
maintaining beneﬁt levels, is known as an income disregard policy. Ad-
ditionally, for the ﬁrst 4 months of employment, AFDC recipients could
also disregard an additional $30 plus one-third of the remaining earn-
ings. For the next 8 months, recipients could continue to disregard $30.
Before PRWORA was enacted, states could obtain waivers from the fed-
eral government to amend the income disregard policy, allowing families
to keep more earnings while on welfare. Under TANF, states have com-
plete leeway to develop their own income disregard programs (USDHHS
[U.S. Department of Health and Human Services] 1997). Policies that
increase income disregards act as an earnings supplement by allowing
parents to combine earnings with income from welfare. Income disre-
gard increases may indirectly affect family arrangements, as they are
likely to increase employment and welfare use. They may have ambig-
uous effects on total income because total work hours may decrease as
earnings increase (Peters et al. 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005).
Paternity Establishment Policies
Throughout the 1990s states varied in the aggressiveness and effective-
ness with which they pursued efforts to establish paternity for children
born out of wedlock. Establishment of paternity, policy makers reasoned,
would enable the state to recoup the cost of welfare by collecting child
support from the fathers of children receiving welfare. The PRWORA
mandates that each state move toward establishing paternity for 90 per-
cent of all nonmarital births (Zaslow et al. 1998). There is nevertheless
wide variation across states in the rates of achieving this goal. Although
paternity establishment increases child support payments and, thus, chil-
dren’s household income (Argys, Peters, and Waldman 2001), the total
effect of such policies on living arrangements is unclear, as increased
child support enforcement can have offsetting effects on men and
women. For example, increases in child support can decrease the costs
of nonmarital childbearing for women but increase them for men (Pe-
ters et al. 2003). In addition, paternity establishment policies may in-
crease marriage or cohabitation, as such policies also increase the fa-
ther’s costs of maintaining a separate household and paying child356 Social Service Review
support. Some research ﬁnds that child support and paternity estab-
lishment policies are associated with declines in rates of nonmarital
childbearing (Garﬁnkel et al. 1998; Plotnick et al. 2001; Peters et al.
2004) and divorce (Nixon 1997).
Policies for Married Welfare Recipients
Under AFDC, married couples’ eligibility for cash assistance was severely
limited. The 100-hour rule stated that if the primary wage earner worked
more than 100 hours in a month, the family was not eligible for welfare
beneﬁts, regardless of income. Additionally, the labor-force attachment
rule required that, for the family to qualify for beneﬁts, this earner must
either earn at least $50 in 6 of the 13 quarters prior to applying for
assistance or have been eligible for unemployment compensation in the
past year (USDHHS 1997). These strict policies essentially excluded
most two-parent families from eligibility for welfare. During the early
1990s, some states received waivers to change these requirements, al-
lowing some married-couple families to receive public assistance. Under
TANF, states can determine their own eligibility standards for married
parents. If changes increase the ﬂexibility of eligibility policies for mar-
ried parents, welfare use is likely to grow among low-income married
parents. Such changes also would likely increase marriage among low-
income couples with a previous nonmarital birth and would reduce rates
of divorce among married low-income couples (Peters et al. 2003). Rob-
ert Mofﬁtt (1998) ﬁnds some evidence that, under AFDC, state increases
in eligibility for married parents also are related to increases in marriage
rates.
Family Caps
Welfare payments typically increase with family size. This led some to
worry that women would have additional children in order to increase
their welfare beneﬁts (Murray 1984). During the early 1990s, some states
attempted to remove this incentive by imposing limits, called family
caps, on the beneﬁts paid to families. Such policies effectively cap the
welfare beneﬁt to families, regardless of the family’s size. Under TANF,
states are free to decide whether and what type of family cap to impose
(USDHHS 1997). Family caps are expected to decrease the likelihood
that women on public assistance will have additional children (Peters
et al. 2003). Nevertheless, research is mixed on the relation between
family caps and nonmarital fertility. Several studies ﬁnd no association
between the family cap policy and nonmarital births (Dyer and Fairlie
2004; Joyce et al. 2004; Ryan, Manlove, and Hofferth 2006). Others
(Horvath-Rose and Peters 2001; Horvath-Rose, Peters, and Sabia 2008)
ﬁnd evidence that the family cap is associated with a decline in non-
marital births.Welfare and Children 357
Previous Research on Welfare Reform and
Living Arrangements
Several researchers examine the inﬂuence of welfare policies on living
arrangements. A large literature, summarized in Mofﬁtt (1998), looks
not at speciﬁc welfare policies but instead at welfare beneﬁt levels, re-
lating these levels to marriage and fertility behaviors. Mofﬁtt concludes
that, in the bare majority of studies, rates of marriage decline and fertility
increases as beneﬁts grow. However, the pattern only holds true among
white women, and the estimated effects of beneﬁt levels are very small.
Other research examines how speciﬁc welfare policies, such as the
waivers implemented in the early 1990s, inﬂuence living arrangements.
The overall evidence is mixed, and several studies ﬁnd no effect. Other
studies indicate that any observed effects depend on a variety of factors
such as the speciﬁc type of policy examined, the race of the child, the
characteristics of the child’s family, and the type of living arrangement
measured.
Some evidence on the links between welfare policies and living ar-
rangements comes from experimental studies that took place prior to
1996. In their summary of these pre-PRWORA experiments, Jeffrey
Grogger and Lynn Karoly (2005) conclude that mandatory work re-
quirements alone do not appear to affect rates of marriage; however,
work incentives (such as increases in income disregards) are found to
promote marriage by reducing divorce and separation among those who
are already married. An evaluation of the Minnesota Family Investment
Program, an experimental intervention that required work and helped
to increase income, ﬁnds that the program led to an increase in marriage
(Gennetian and Miller 2004). Another study, which includes data from
14 random assignment studies designed to promote work and reduce
welfare, shows that welfare experiments do not increase marriage among
single mothers (Gennetian and Knox 2003). Contradictory results are
found in analyses of data from welfare reform experiments that in-
creased the income disregard in two sites in Canada (Harknett and
Gennetian 2003). In one location, the increased income disregard is
associated with an increase in the rate of marriage, but it is associated
with a marriage rate decline in the other location. The authors conclude
that the effects of welfare policies may be moderated by the local labor
market and other conditions.
Other data come from the New Hope project, an experimental study
of an antipoverty program that took place in Milwaukee in the mid-
1990s. Using data from this project, Anna Gassman-Pines, Hirokazu
Yoshikawa, and Sandra Nay (2006) ﬁnd that participation in New Hope
leads to an increase in marriage among single mothers. Using both
qualitative and quantitative data, the authors further reveal that this
increase is primarily due to increased earnings and subsequent im-358 Social Service Review
provements in relationship quality among those participating in the
program.
Additional studies use nonexperimental data to relate changes in
welfare policies to changes in living arrangements. In order to address
the fact that states differ from each other in a variety of ways other than
in their welfare policies, most nonexperimental studies of this topic
include state and year ﬁxed effects. They thereby estimate the inﬂuence
of welfare reform from within-state policy changes over time. As Grogger
and Karoly (2005) note, the results of these studies are inconsistent.
Suzanne Ryan and colleagues (2006) use Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics data (1989–96) to examine the ways in which speciﬁc pre-TANF
waivers, such as family caps, sanctions, and time limits, inﬂuence non-
marital childbearing among unmarried mothers who received welfare.
They ﬁnd no associations between these policies and fertility outcomes.
Gregory Acs and Sandi Nelson (2004) use data from the 1997 and
1999 rounds of the National Survey of America’s Families to examine
how changes in welfare policies inﬂuence children’s living arrange-
ments. They focus speciﬁcally on the strictness of state sanction policies,
whether the states have a family cap, the effectiveness of the state child
support enforcement, and whether the state has expanded welfare el-
igibility for two-parent families. Separate regression analyses are used
for each policy, making it difﬁcult to determine whether the results are
picking up the effect of one policy or whether a single policy is acting
as a proxy for a group of others. Results from these analyses suggest
that increases in child support collection and family caps are both as-
sociated with a reduction in the number of children living in single-
parent families and an increase in the rate of marriage. In contrast, no
consistent associations are found for sanction policies or eligibility for
married parents. Acs and Nelson (2004) examine whether children lived
with a married parent, a single parent, or no parent, but they do not
consider whether a single mother doubles up by living with other adults.
John Fitzgerald and David Ribar (2004b) use data from the 1990,
1992, 1993, and 1996 SIPP panels to relate changes in both welfare
policies and local economic conditions to the incidence of female head-
ship (i.e., being unmarried and living with a child) and to women’s
transitions into and out of headship. They focus solely on whether a
woman was married and do not examine whether the female head lived
in the household with other adults (such as a cohabiting partner or her
parents). Their overall results show few statistically signiﬁcant associa-
tions between state welfare policies and female headship. Fitzgerald and
Ribar (2004a) use the same data to estimate spells of female headship
and welfare participation, ﬁnding that participation in welfare increases
the amount of time women remain single mothers. Welfare waivers and
the implementation of TANF are not found to be associated with spells
of welfare participation or of female headship. Like the current work,Welfare and Children 359
these studies capture a wide range of pre-TANF state welfare policies.
Unlike the current article, however, they do not distinguish different
types of state TANF policies but instead use a dummy variable to indicate
that a state implemented TANF.
Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the 1989–2000 pe-
riod, Marianne Bitler, Jonah Gelbach, and Hilary Hoynes (2006) relate
changes in state welfare policies to children’s living arrangements. They
employ repeated cross-sections of data along with state and year ﬁxed
effects. Rather than distinguishing between different types of waiver and
TANF policies, the study by Bitler and colleagues (2006) uses dummy
variables in the main analysis to indicate whether a state has any waiver
or has TANF in place. They ﬁnd in general that welfare waivers are
associated with an increase in the likelihood of living with neither parent
(found primarily for African American and white children), a decrease
in living with an unmarried parent, and an increase in the likelihood
of living with a married parent (concentrated among Hispanics).
Marcia Carlson and colleagues (2004) take the study of the association
between welfare policies and living arrangements further, examining
welfare policies’ links to cohabitation, marriage, and romantic but non-
cohabiting relationships. Using a sample of couples who recently had
a nonmarital birth, the authors relate welfare beneﬁts to a measure of
the couples’ relationship status 1 year after the birth. They ﬁnd that
high welfare beneﬁts are associated with a decrease in couples’ breakups.
To date, most studies of the effect of PRWORA on children’s living
arrangements include only a simple measure of whether the state im-
plemented TANF. Few measure different welfare policy components
such as the implementation of family caps or income disregards. In an
era when states have choices about the welfare policies they implement,
it is crucial to understand how speciﬁc state policies inﬂuence children.
In addition, because most studies compare state policy changes that
occur over time, they run into well-documented estimation problems
(National Research Council 2001) when using a single dummy variable
for TANF implementation, in that states implemented TANF over a
period of a year and a half. To address such issues, this study draws
upon data from both before and after TANF implementation to examine
the ways in which children’s living arrangements are inﬂuenced by such
speciﬁc welfare policy components as time limits, sanctions, and income
disregards.
This study also differs from previous work in other ways. In order to
provide detailed information about changes in children’s living arrange-
ments, it uses multinomial logistic regression models (most other studies
employ logistic regression models) to show the speciﬁc types of changes
that children experience in living arrangements. Logistic regression
models reveal whether a change in state policy is associated with an
increase in a particular living arrangement (e.g., living with a single360 Social Service Review
parent). Multinomial logistic regressions allow one to determine
whether an increase in single parenthood resulted from a reduction in
marriage or from a reduction in living with other adults, two very dif-
ferent paths into single parenthood. This provides a richer picture of
the ways in which welfare policies may inﬂuence living arrangements.
In addition to the state ﬁxed-effects models (which have commonly
been used in this literature), this study employs the longitudinal design
of the SIPP panels to estimate individual ﬁxed-effects models in which
changes in living arrangements are tracked for the same child over time.
Although state ﬁxed-effects models control for time-invariant charac-
teristics of the state, individual ﬁxed-effects models control for all time-
invariant characteristics of the individual child. Results are contrasted
across the two types of models.
Data
This study examines the inﬂuence of state welfare policies on three
measures of children’s living arrangements: living with a single parent,
living with a married parent, and living with a parent and another adult
(doubling up). It relies on data from the 1992, 1993, and 1996 panels
of the SIPP. The SIPP was designed to help the government evaluate
social programs, and SIPP data include detailed information on income,
program participation, and family demographics (Westat and Mathe-
matica 2001). A nationally representative sample of households was se-
lected to participate in each panel. The survey provides information
about both the household and the individuals within the household.
Data were collected every 4 months for the duration of the panel.
2
In the SIPP, questions about living arrangements are posed at each
wave (i.e., every 4 months). These questions identify the parent of each
child, the parent’s marital status, and the number of other adults in the
household. Because the policy variables included in the current study
are measured each year, annual measures of children’s living arrange-
ments (described in more detail below) were created. A child-year ﬁle
was created from these data. It includes one observation for each child
in each year. Thus, the ﬁle includes multiple children from a family
and up to four observations per child. All analyses cluster by individual
to adjust for the fact that children appear in the data multiple times;
this also adjusts for clustering at the state level.
Because the main models (described below) use within-state changes
in policies to predict changes in children’s living arrangements, the
current analyses require an adequate number of children in each state,
in each year, and in each of the three living arrangement categories to
generate robust estimates. (Grogger and Karoly [2005] discuss the im-
portance of having adequate sample sizes in state-level analyses.) To
achieve this, all analyses are restricted to the largest states. These includeWelfare and Children 361
Table 1
Distribution of Observations across States and Years
State 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Alabama 145 223 206 74 221 201 178 166 1,414
California 444 814 710 354 632 497 422 379 4,252
Florida 268 504 461 218 454 333 275 238 2,751
Georgia 221 470 434 215 405 320 281 243 2,589
Illinois 278 537 529 255 369 345 272 232 2,817
Indiana 167 398 387 205 255 244 224 198 2,078
Maryland 106 203 181 75 159 142 109 84 1,059
Michigan 279 538 502 223 398 352 273 262 2,827
Mississippi 131 252 228 92 229 202 207 176 1,517
Missouri 180 332 311 151 282 250 204 171 1,881
New Jersey 163 337 315 158 260 223 326 153 1,790
New York 389 730 641 309 567 469 409 361 3,875
North Carolina 219 386 363 151 314 306 244 196 2,179
Ohio 299 560 531 259 494 396 326 314 3,179
Pennsylvania 332 639 609 281 539 513 420 367 3,700
South Carolina 106 227 220 118 251 202 165 150 1,439
Tennessee 134 264 236 119 267 237 192 164 1,613
Texas 323 618 556 257 493 452 368 326 3,393
Virginia 124 256 231 112 232 195 185 159 1,494
Total 4,308 8,288 7,651 3,626 6,821 5,879 4,935 4,339 45,847
Sources.—1992, 1993, and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation.
Note.—Sample restricted to non-Hispanic African American children and children of
low-educated (high school degree or less) non-Hispanic whites who live in the states listed.
states that have at least ﬁve observations in each category of living ar-
rangements (married, single, and doubled up) in every year for both
the white and African American subsamples. Nineteen states meet these
criteria, providing data that represent 73 percent of the child-spell ob-
servations in the SIPP panels (see table 1 for a list of included states).
The prevalence of various living arrangements varies greatly by race.
Analyses are therefore conducted separately for non-Hispanic white chil-
dren and for non-Hispanic African American children. Because of in-
adequate sample sizes, it is not possible to separately examine Hispanics.
Speciﬁcally, 68 percent of the person-year observations of Hispanics are
clustered in only two states, and 82 percent are clustered in four states.
As a result, any state-level analyses using Hispanic children would be
limited to a very small number of states and would not be comparable
to the other analyses.
Analyses exclude spells in which children live in households without
either biological parent. In addition, because welfare policies may be
particularly inﬂuential on the living arrangements of children in families
that are most likely to use welfare, the sample of white children is
restricted to those whose mother (or household head, if information
on the mother is missing) has no more than a high school degree362 Social Service Review
(diploma or general equivalency diploma; child-year obser- n p 29,713
vations). For African American children, sample sizes are not sufﬁcient
to apply this education restriction.
3 The analyses for African American
children therefore include those with all levels of parental education
( child-year observations). Even without the education re- n p 16,134
striction, however, the African American sample includes more house-
holds that receive welfare income (35 percent) than does the white
sample (12 percent). The difference is due in part to the high number
of African American children in single-parent families. To account for
this difference between the white and African American samples, anal-
yses using data for the African American sample include a dummy var-
iable that indicates whether the child’s parent has more than a high
school degree. As noted below, some sensitivity tests examine how the
pattern of results for the less educated white sample compares with the
pattern for those who have a high school degree or more. Finally, to
avoid including children who are themselves parents, the sample is lim-
ited to children who are aged 15 or younger.
Methods
The goal of these analyses is to relate changes in state welfare policies
throughout the 1990s to changes in children’s living arrangements. The
statistical models predict whether a child lives with a married parent,
with a single parent, or in a doubled-up household. Several different
speciﬁcations are estimated in order to identify effects that are robust
across models. Because the current analyses are based on a unique
sample of children in 19 select states, and because they involve state-
level analyses, weights are not used.
The state ﬁxed-effects analyses employ a repeated cross-section model
that identiﬁes policy effects from differences in state policies. Multi-
nomial logistic regression models are used as the primary speciﬁcation
and are characterized as follows:
[exp(X b b W b C k S d d  )] ist 1j 2js t 3js t j s s jt i s t Pr(y p j) p ,( 1 ) J i
[1exp(X b b W b C k S d d  )] ist 1j 2js t 3js t j s s jt i s t
j
where j indicates the number of categories of living arrangements ex-
amined; i, s, and t index the individual, state, and year, respectively; X
is a set of exogenous child and family characteristics; W is a vector of
state welfare policy variables; C is a set of controls for state economic
conditions; S is a set of state dummies; and d is a set of year dummies.
These models estimate whether within-state changes in welfare policies
are associated with changes in children’s living arrangements. The base
category is varied in order to examine three sets of arrangements: the
likelihood of living with a married parent is compared to that of livingWelfare and Children 363
with a single parent, the likelihood of living with a married parent is
compared to that of living in a doubled-up household, and the likeli-
hood of living with a single parent is compared to that of living in a
doubled-up household. To facilitate comparisons between the state and
child ﬁxed-effects models, results from logistic regression models with
state ﬁxed effects are also presented.
Results from child-speciﬁc ﬁxed-effects analyses are also presented.
These analyses examine whether changes in state welfare policies are
related to within-child changes in living arrangements over time. This
model controls for any child or family characteristics that do not change
over time and adjusts for the fact that unobserved characteristics of a
child and his or her family may be associated both with that child’s
living arrangements and with the state in which the family lives. Because
the child ﬁxed-effects model cannot be estimated for children who do
not experience a transition in living arrangements during the panel,
the sample size for these analyses is substantially smaller than that used
in the state ﬁxed-effects model. Because of the small sample size, ade-
quate power is not available to perform multinomial logistic regression
models; therefore, results are presented from logistic regression models
that are characterized as follows:
Pr(y p 1) p 1/{1 exp[(b X  b W  b C  k I   )]}, (2) i 1ji s t 2js t 3js t j i i i s t
where all variables are as above. However, the state and time ﬁxed effects
are removed, and an individual ﬁxed effect (Ii) is included, instead.
Each model (state and child ﬁxed effects) has strengths and limita-
tions. The advantage of state ﬁxed-effects models lies in the larger sam-
ple size, which allows analyses to use data on all children and to estimate
multinomial logistic regressions. These regressions provide rich com-
parisons of various living arrangements. The child ﬁxed-effects model,
although based on a much smaller sample of children, is estimated from
data on children who are actually observed making a transition in living
arrangements over the same time period that a welfare policy change
was enacted. This model also enables one to control for any unobserv-
able, time-invariant characteristics of the child or his or her family.
As Hoynes (1997) notes, results from state and individual ﬁxed-effects
models should differ only if people move between states in ways that
are correlated with welfare policies. Only 1.37 percent of the children
in the sample are observed moving between the states included in the
analyses during the panel. Given the large sample sizes, this is not likely
to be enough movement to inﬂuence results. Accordingly, the child and
state ﬁxed-effects models should produce similar results. However, be-
cause the SIPP is a panel data set that follows households, not a lon-
gitudinal study of children, children enter and leave the sample for
many reasons (e.g., birth, moving to or from a nonincluded state, mov-
ing into or out of a sampled household, reaching age 16, and panel364 Social Service Review
attrition).
4 Of the 18,913 children ever in the analysis sample, only 46
percent contribute observations for the potential maximum of 3 years
(in the 1992 and 1993 panels) or 4 years (in the 1996 panel). These
movements into and out of the panel may increase the standard errors
on the estimates but should only bias the coefﬁcients if systematically
associated with welfare policies; for instance, such bias might occur if
the policies consistently cause people to move across state lines or out
of the sample. Given the strengths and weaknesses of these various
models, the discussion focuses on results that are robust across model
speciﬁcations.
Measures
Dependent Variables
The three main dependent variables are dummy variables measuring
children’s living arrangements. The ﬁrst dummy variable, Married, in-
dicates that a child lives with a married parent (including biological
married parents as well as married stepmother and stepfather families).
A second dummy variable, Doubled Up, indicates that a child lives with
a single parent (either the mother or father) and with other adults
(including cohabitors, grandparents, roommates, and children over age
18).
5 A third dummy variable, Single, indicates that a child lives with
an unmarried parent (either the mother or father) and no other adults.
The measures of living arrangements are based on snapshots taken
at the ﬁrst interview and again every 12 months thereafter. These snap-
shots provide a measure of living arrangements for each year that the
children are in the panel. Thus, the measure of living arrangements in
1996 refers to the spring of that year (when the ﬁrst wave of data was
collected), the 1997 measure indicates the living arrangement 12
months later, and so on. Changes occurring in the intervening 12
months are reﬂected in the next year’s measure of living arrangements.
This means that it is possible to miss some short-term living arrange-
ments if they start and end within a year. In addition, it is possible that
the policy changes measured here were enacted after the measure of
living arrangements was taken in a given year. This is one reason why
the preferred analyses relate policy changes enacted in a prior year to
changes in living arrangements in the subsequent year (described be-
low). Although data on monthly living arrangements are available in
the SIPP, annual measures are used here. It seems implausible that policy
changes could affect living arrangements so rapidly as to make a monthly
assessment useful. Table 2 shows the distribution of observations across
living arrangements for the white and African American samples used
in the analyses.Welfare and Children 365
Table 2
Distribution of Person-Year Observations across
Living Arrangements
Low-Education
Whites
African
Americans Sum
Married:
n 22,088 6,035 28,123
% 74.34 37.41 61.34
Doubled up:
n 3,796 3,875 7,671
% 12.78 24.02 16.73
Single:
n 3,829 6,224 10,053
% 12.89 38.58 21.93
Total:
n 29,713 16,134 45,847
% 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources.—1992, 1993, and 1996 panel of the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation.
Note.—Sample restricted to non-Hispanic African American
children and children of low-educated (high school degree or
less) non-Hispanic whites who live in large states. Results are
not weighted.
Control Variables from the SIPP
Analyses include a small set of individual and family control variables
that are available in all three panels of the SIPP on an annual basis and
that are not themselves inﬂuenced by state welfare policies: child’s age
(ranging from 0 to 15 years), parent’s age (ranging from 18 to 84 years),
and child sex (0 p female, 1 p male).
6 For the African American
sample, parental education is controlled using a dummy that indicates
whether the parent had more than a high school degree.
State Welfare Policies
The welfare policy variables represent choices that states made between
1992 and 1999 in creating their public assistance programs for low-
income families. Researchers have struggled with how to code welfare
policies in order to capture the diversity of policies that occurred across
the states and over time. Many analyses of welfare reform’s relations
with living arrangements use simple dummy variables to indicate periods
in which states had any pre-TANF waiver in effect and those in which
TANF was in effect (e.g., Bitler et al. 2006). Fewer studies disaggregate
the speciﬁc types of waivers that states had in the pre-TANF period. For
example, some distinguish between the effects of an income disregard
waiver and those of a family cap waiver (see, e.g., Fitzgerald and Ribar
2004b). Very few studies examine speciﬁc dimensions of state policies366 Social Service Review
Table 3
Variation in State Policies: 19 Large States
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Any time limit before TANF 0 0 1 3 12 16 17 17
Strict time limit under TANF 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2
Any sanction before TANF 1 1 3 6 14 18 19 19
Strict sanction under TANF 0 0 0 0 2 13 13 14
Any income disregard before TANF 2 3 5 7 14 19 19 19
Generous ID under TANF 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 3
Family cap 0 1 2 2 6 9 11 11
Increased eligibility for married
families 3 4 5 8 14 14 12 12
Note.—TANF p Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program; ID p income
disregard. For the generous income disregard variable there is more change thanapparent
between 1997 and 1998 because different states are coded one in the years since imple-
mentations of TANF.
since the implementation of TANF (exceptions are Acs and Nelson 2004
and Horvath-Rose et al. 2008). However, as noted earlier, studies run
into identiﬁcation problems in using a single TANF dummy, as all states
implemented TANF over a period of a year and a half.
The current study capitalizes on two sources of variation in state wel-
fare policies: variation in the implementation of speciﬁc welfare policy
waivers in the pre-TANF period and variation in the strictness of state
welfare policies in the period since TANF implementation. Methodo-
logically, this strategy provides greater policy variation in the TANF pe-
riod, thus reducing (though not eliminating) the estimation problems
faced by studies that use a dummy variable for TANF implementation.
In addition, this strategy provides more speciﬁc information about the
estimated effects of various state policies on children’s living arrange-
ments.
To operationalize this strategy, models include two variables for some
key policy measures. For instance, two variables measure states’ sanction
policies. The ﬁrst of these variables is an indicator of whether the state
imposes any kind of sanction. In the pre-TANF period, this indicator is
coded one for each year in which a state had a sanction waiver in place
and zero otherwise; in the TANF period (i.e., after TANF was imple-
mented), when sanctions became universal, this variable is coded one
for all states. The second sanction variable measures the strictness of a
state’s sanction policy in the TANF era. It is equal to zero in years before
TANF was implemented (1992–95 for most states; 1992–97 for Califor-
nia). After the implementation of TANF, this variable equals one if a
state has a comparably strict sanction policy and is zero otherwise. Table
3 shows the number of states that have in place each type of policy in
each year.Welfare and Children 367
The state ﬁxed-effects analyses include state and year dummy vari-
ables, which account for unobserved between-state differences that may
inﬂuence children’s living arrangements. Therefore, estimates of the
inﬂuence of policies on living arrangements are derived from within-
state changes in welfare policies over time. The child ﬁxed-effects anal-
yses are based on changes in individual living arrangements that occur
along with within-state changes in welfare policies. One drawback of
these strategies is that they place a great deal of demand upon the data;
speciﬁcally, they are based on the assumption that children’s living ar-
rangements will change in the same year that states change welfare
policies. To address this, the preferred models include a 1-year lag be-
tween the policy change and the measurement of living arrangements.
Additionally, if state policies are highly correlated, then it will be difﬁcult
to precisely estimate the effect of one policy among many. In order to
reduce this possibility, analyses exclude policies that are highly corre-
lated with other represented policies. For instance, many previous stud-
ies account for the generosity of states’ welfare policies by including a
control for the maximum AFDC or TANF beneﬁt level for a family of
three. However, this variable is excluded here because it is highly cor-
related with the measure of the incremental beneﬁt available upon the
birth of another child (described below); therefore, a measure of the
maximum beneﬁt level is excluded in the analyses.
Time limits.—Time limits are measured with two dummy variables. The
ﬁrst variable is coded one for the year that the state implemented a
time limit through a waiver and for each year thereafter. All states are
coded one for this variable after the state implemented TANF, as TANF
made time limits universal (exceptions are Michigan and New York,
which do not have time limits, even under TANF). Data on state im-
plementation of time limit waivers come from Gil Crouse (1999). The
second variable captures whether the state has a strict time limit policy
in the TANF era. It is scored as one if the state has a time limit of less
than 5 years (i.e., more strict than the federal standard) and zero oth-
erwise (Urban Institute n.d.).
Sanctions.—Sanctions are also measured with two dummy variables.
First, states are coded one for the year in which the state implemented
a sanction (either under a waiver or under TANF) and for each year
thereafter (data from Crouse 1999). All states are coded one on this
variable after the implementation of TANF made sanctions universal.
The second variable captures whether states have a strict sanction policy:
states are coded one if they have a full-beneﬁt sanction, rather than a
partial one (that is, the beneﬁt for the entire family is eliminated instead
of reduced when sanctions are imposed; Urban Institute n.d.) and zero
otherwise.
Income disregards.—Two dummy variables capture states’ income dis-
regard policies. In the ﬁrst, states are coded with a variable equaling368 Social Service Review
one in the year that they ﬁrst allowed welfare recipients to keep more
of their earnings while remaining eligible for welfare, and are coded
thusly for each year thereafter. In the TANF period, a variable for the
generosity of the state’s income disregard is used. This measure equals
one if a state is in the highest quartile for the amount of income that
is disregarded (Urban Institute n.d.). Thus, in contrast to the preceding
variables, the income disregard measure in both the pre–welfare reform
and welfare reform periods indicates states that are more generous than
other states.
Paternity establishment.—For each year, a state’s effectiveness in estab-
lishing paternities is measured with the paternity establishment rate.
This is the number of paternities established in a state divided by the
number of out-of-wedlock births, for each year (Administration for Chil-
dren and Families 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; National
Center for Health Statistics n.d.). This rate for a given year can be greater
than one if the state establishes paternities both for births in that year
and for births from previous years.
Eligibility for married parents.—For each year in the pre-TANF and TANF
periods, a dummy variable is created to indicate whether a state relaxed
the restrictive eligibility rules for married-parent families. This variable
is coded one if a state eliminated the 100-hour rule or the labor-force
attachment rule and zero if neither rule was eliminated. Data for this
measure came from USDHHS (1997).
Family caps.—As noted earlier, some states were concerned that in-
creasing welfare beneﬁts to cover growth in family size encourages wel-
fare recipients to have additional children. In order to change this
incentive, some states adopted policies that limit (or eliminate) the
amount of additional beneﬁts provided to mothers who bear children
while they receive welfare beneﬁts. However, when states compute food
stamp beneﬁts, cash assistance is taxed at a 30 percent rate. This means
that, among families of the same size, those that have their beneﬁts
capped are actually eligible for more food stamp assistance than those
that have not. Finally, some states that have family caps provide families
with a voucher to be used for approved purchases (e.g., Wallace 2009).
To capture all this variation in family cap policies, this study uses a
variable representing the total incremental cash assistance and food
stamp beneﬁt (in constant 1999 dollars) that a family would receive if
a single mother with two children in that state gave birth to another
child (Geoffrey Wallace, personal communication). This allows one not
only to distinguish states with caps from states that lack them but also
to address the nuanced ways in which states’ family cap policies differ.
Moreover, this allows analyses to assess the actual impact that living in
a capped state would have on a family’s resources. Because the existence
of a family cap policy may have an effect independent of the actual cashWelfare and Children 369
beneﬁts, we also include a dummy variable coded as one if the state has
a family cap in place in a given year.
The measures used in this study describe the actual policies imple-
mented by states as a result of welfare reform. As noted above, the focus
is on the main policy areas in which welfare reform took place, because
these areas are most likely to play a role in children’s living arrange-
ments. Other research uses a much wider set of state policies and per-
forms factor analysis to identify policy typologies that were implemented
in the wake of welfare reform (Graefe, De Jong, and Irving 2006; De
Jong et al. 2006). Such research helps categorize patterns of welfare
policies, describing how such patterns changed over time and vary across
states. However, it does not inform policy makers about whether speciﬁc
welfare policies, if implemented, are likely to produce changes in living
arrangements. Both strategies provide useful information; this study
focuses on individual policies because the goal is to understand the
effects of speciﬁc policies.
State Control Measures
Analyses also control for other state-level factors that might inﬂuence
state decisions to implement the examined welfare policies and the
measured outcomes. Analyses control for these factors in each year. The
preferred models lag each of these controls by 1 year. The controls
include the unemployment rate for men and women (Bureau of Labor
Statistics n.d.), real median wages for men and women (authors’ cal-
culations using 3-year moving averages from March CPS data), the max-
imum value of the federal and state earned income tax credit (EITC)
for a single mother with two children in constant 1999 dollars (Leigh
2003; Tax Policy Center 2009), the amount of federal housing money
spent per 1,000 residents in the state (U.S. Census Bureau 1993–2001),
the income eligibility limit for Medicaid for pregnant women (National
Governors Association 2001), and the annual employment growth rate
(data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment
Statistics). It is important to note that this study may still not be able
to measure all of the important within-state changes that are associated
with changes in family structure.
Tables 4 and 5 present descriptive statistics for all independent var-
iables used in the analyses. Results are listed separately by race.
Speciﬁcation Tests
As described above, the preferred speciﬁcation uses dummy variables
to indicate a year in which a speciﬁc policy was implemented and lags
the policies by 1 year. This coding system uses dummy variables to in-
dicate whether a given policy was in place in a given year. For most of370 Social Service Review
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Children of Women with High School Degree
or Less ( ) N p 29,713
Mean SD Min Max
Any time limit before TANF .36 … 0 1
Strict time limit under TANF .04 … 0 1
Any sanction before TANF .46 … 0 1
Strict sanction under TANF .21 … 0 1
Any ID before-TANF .56 … 0 1
Generous ID under TANF .07 … 0 1
Paternity establishment rate .59 .36 .04 2.52
Increased eligibility for married families .45 … 0 1
Family cap .21 … 0 1
State EITC ($100s) 32.65 10.01 17.72 49.58
Housing ($100s) .38 … 0 1
Incremental beneﬁts ($100s) 1.15 .24 .71 1.67
Unemployment rate (%) 5.82 1.44 2.78 9.38
Median real wage (hourly $) 13.01 1.43 9.90 17.07
Medicaid eligibility limit (% of poverty line) 175.75 38.55 133 400
Employment growth .02 .01 .02 .04
Child is male .52 … 0 1
Child’s age (years) 7.73 4.49 0 15
Parent’s age (years) 33.44 6.85 18 84
Sources.—1992, 1993, and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Note.—SD p standard deviation; TANF p Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
program; EITC p Earned Income Tax Credit; ID p income disregard policy. Sample is
restricted to those who live in 19 large states. Results are for all person-year spells included
in multivariate analyses and are not weighted.
these policies, this system is used because the real variation comes from
whether a state has a policy in place or not, and there is very little
variation otherwise. For example, there is very little variation among
states with a time limit in place; such states either have a 2- or 5-year
limit. The only measure that could potentially be used in a continuous
manner is the measure of a state’s income disregard, which ranges from
$0 to over $900. Additional analyses examine whether results are robust
to the use of a continuous measure of income disregard (available upon
request). These analyses do not appreciably change the main results.
Several other speciﬁcation tests were also conducted in order to en-
sure that the results are robust to alternate policy speciﬁcations. Some
tests code policy variables according to the proportion of the year the
state had a speciﬁc policy in place (instead of using a dummy variable
indicating that the state implemented the policy at any point in the
year).
7 Both the dummy variable and the proportion speciﬁcations were
also tested with the welfare policies and state control variables that are
not lagged by 1 year. Other analyses use the full sample of states instead
of the large-state restriction discussed above. The results presented be-
low stem from the preferred speciﬁcation, which uses dummy variables
to indicate a year in which a speciﬁc policy was implemented and lagsWelfare and Children 371
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for African American Women ( ) N p 16,134
Mean SD Min Max
Any time limit pre-TANF .41 … 0 1
Strict time limit under TANF .07 … 0 1
Any sanction pre-TANF .53 … 0 1
Strict sanction under TANF .27 … 0 1
Any ID pre-TANF .60 … 0 1
Generous ID under TANF .08 … 0 1
Paternity establishment rate .57 .33 .04 2.52
Increased eligibility for married families .48 … 0 1
Family cap .27 … 0 1
State EITC ($100s) 34.04 9.98 17.72 49.58
Housing ($100s) .40 … 0 1
Incremental beneﬁts ($100s) 1.11 .25 .71 1.67
Unemployment rate (%) 5.67 1.38 2.78 9.38
Median real wage (hourly $) 12.81 1.48 9.90 17.07
Medicaid eligibility limit (% of poverty line) 176.89 31.31 133 400
Employment growth .02 .01 .02 .04
Child is male .51 … 0 1
Child’s age (years) 7.56 4.47 0 15
Parent’s age (years) 33.17 7.51 18 71
Parent has more than HS degree .39 … 0 1
Sources.—1992, 1993, and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
Note.—SD p standard deviation; TANF p Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
program; EITC p Earned Income Tax Credit; ID p income disregard policy; HS p high
school. Sample restricted to those who live in 19 large states. Results are for all person-
year spells included in multivariate analyses and are not weighted.
this dummy variable by 1 year. A summary table also presents results
from alternate model speciﬁcations. The discussion is restricted to re-
sults that are robust across model speciﬁcations.
Results
Table 6 presents results from multinomial logistic regression analyses
that use the state ﬁxed-effects models shown in equation (1). For each
group of children, three columns of logit coefﬁcients are presented to
highlight the three possible comparisons in the multinomial logit model;
these coefﬁcients are computed by changing the omitted category of
living arrangements. Results are presented separately for white children
of parents with low education (a high school degree or less) and for
African American children. Table 7 summarizes state ﬁxed-effects anal-
yses using alternative methods of coding the policy variables. Results
marked with an asterisk in table 7 are robust across various policy coding
schemes.
Results from table 6 show some scattered associations between welfare
policies and children’s living arrangements. Most of these are for African372
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American children. Some associations are not robust across model spec-
iﬁcations, but others are consistent across the policy measures (as iden-
tiﬁed by asterisks in table 7). The discussion focuses on relations that
are consistent in at least three policy speciﬁcations, including the pre-
ferred lagged dummy variable speciﬁcation.
Table 6 provides evidence that time limits in the pre-TANF years are
associated with an increase in the likelihood that African American
children live with single parents relative to the likelihood that they live
in doubled-up households. For African American and for white children
in the restricted sample, strict time limits under TANF are associated
with an increase in the likelihood of living with married parents relative
to that of living in a doubled-up household. For white children, the
same policy is also associated with an increase in the likelihood of living
with a single mother relative to that of living in a doubled-up household.
Additionally, a generous income disregard under TANF is associated
with a decrease in the likelihood that African American children live
with a single parent relative to the likelihood that they live in a doubled-
up household. Increases in the rate of paternity establishment are as-
sociated with a decrease in the likelihood that African American chil-
dren live with a single mother relative to that of living in a doubled-up
household. Also, for African American children, policies that increase
eligibility for married families are associated with an increase in the
likelihood of living with a married parent relative to that of living in a
doubled-up household. In contrast, for white children in this sample,
such policies are associated with an increase in the likelihood of living
with a single parent relative to that of living in a doubled-up household.
These associations are relatively consistent across various methods of
coding policy variables.
One striking feature is the fact that the pattern of results differs a
great deal by race; there are very few instances in which the pattern of
statistically signiﬁcant results is the same for both white and African
American children. In addition, no policy has the same estimated effect
during the pre-TANF period as it has after the implementation of TANF.
For example, time limits before TANF are associated with an increase
in the likelihood that African American children live with a single parent
relative to the likelihood that they live in a doubled-up household; time
limits under TANF are associated with an increase in the likelihood that
African American children will live in married households relative to
that of living with single parents.
As noted above, the sample of white children was restricted to those
whose mothers have a high school degree or less. The restriction is
based on the assumption that welfare policies would be more likely to
inﬂuence the living arrangements of these mothers. An additional spec-
iﬁcation test looks at the sample of white children living with mothers
who have more than a high school degree. In principle, there should376 Social Service Review
be few or no associations between welfare policies and living arrange-
ments for children in this group. Indeed, this is the case for the most
part (results not shown). Of the four statistically signiﬁcant associations
shown in table 6 for white children of low-education parents, none is
statistically signiﬁcant when the test looks at children whose mothers
have more than a high school degree. However, two new statistically
signiﬁcant associations do emerge in the speciﬁcation with the children
of more educated mothers. Speciﬁcally, the presence of a pre-TANF
time limit is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of both marriage
and single parenthood. This suggests that the measure of pre-TANF
time limits may pick up some other aspect of state policies or environ-
ments that inﬂuenced the behavior of even more advantaged families,
increasing the skepticism over any results concerning this measure.
Table 8 presents a summary of the results of state ﬁxed-effects models
based on logistic regressions (in contrast to the multinomial logistic
results shown in table 7). These results facilitate comparisons with the
individual ﬁxed-effects models that are presented below. In the state
ﬁxed-effects models, the comparison group includes more than one
living arrangement; for instance, when looking at the likelihood that a
child lives in a doubled-up household, the comparison group is children
living in both married and single-parent arrangements. Results in table
8 are consistent with those from table 7.
Table 9 presents the results of the individual ﬁxed-effects models (eq.
[2]), which relate changes in state welfare policies to changes in indi-
vidual children’s living arrangements over time. A summary of results
from alternative speciﬁcations is presented in table 10. Some results are
consistent across the various methods of measuring welfare policies.
Some of these results are also consistent with the ﬁndings in the state
ﬁxed-effects models. The presence of pre-TANF time limits is associated
with an increase in the likelihood that African American children live
with a single parent relative to all other living arrangements. Among
white children in this restricted sample, strict time limits under TANF
are associated with an increase in the likelihood of living with a single
parent. Strict time limits under TANF are also associated with an increase
in the likelihood that African American children live in a married house-
hold. Finally, a generous income disregard under TANF is associated
with a decrease in the likelihood that African American children will
live with a single parent.
In some cases, associations that fall short of statistical signiﬁcance in
the state ﬁxed-effects models appear to attain it in the individual ﬁxed-
effects models and vice versa. Associations between increased eligibility
for married families and the likelihood that African American children
live in married families, associations that are statistically signiﬁcant in
tables 7 and 8, are not statistically signiﬁcant in the individual ﬁxed-
effects models. An association between a family cap and increased like-T
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lihood that African American children live with a single parent appears
to be statistically signiﬁcant in table 10, but these ﬁndings were not
robust in the models that include state ﬁxed effects.
Although changes in EITC beneﬁts are not a focus of this study, their
inﬂuence on children’s living arrangements is worthy of examination.
During the 1990s, state EITC beneﬁts increased dramatically (see
Schmeiser 2008). The individual ﬁxed-effects results (table 9) show that,
among white and African American children in this sample, increases
in the state EITC are associated with increases in the likelihood of living
with single parents. State EITC increases also are found to decrease the
likelihood that African American children live in married households.
The coefﬁcients in the state ﬁxed-effects models (table 6) operate in
the same direction but are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Discussion
This article examines how children’s living arrangements relate to the
choices states made regarding their welfare policies in the 1990s. Using
SIPP data from the period between 1992 and 1999, the models rely on
within-state changes in welfare policies to predict changes in children’s
living arrangements. This study expands on the current literature in
several ways.
First, these analyses use detailed measures of welfare policy compo-
nents, such as time limits, sanctions, and earning disregards, to examine
the periods before and after TANF was implemented. Most previous
studies employ dummy variables to indicate whether a state had any
policy in effect in a given year rather than measuring speciﬁc types of
policies. Second, dependent variables represent several living arrange-
ment categories, including situations in which single parents double up
with partners, their own parents, or other adults, and analyses use multi-
nomial logistic regression models that provide insight into the transi-
tions in children’s living arrangements. Finally, the robustness of the
results are thoroughly tested with an extensive series of speciﬁcation
tests involving both type of model (comparing cross-state and individual
ﬁxed effects) and the ways in which the policy variables were coded
(lagged vs. not lagged, dummy vs. proportion variables).
Overall, the majority of the policies examined here do not show con-
sistent associations with children’s living arrangements. This includes
sanctions, one of the most dramatic policy changes that occurred during
the 1990s. There also is no consistent evidence that some of the policies
most directly tied to children’s living arrangements (speciﬁcally, family
caps, states’ paternity establishment rate, and policies that increase eli-
gibility for married parents) are consistently associated with this outcome.
However, some signiﬁcant associations between welfare policies and
children’s living arrangements are consistent across the wide range of382 Social Service Review
models. Speciﬁcally, in states that implemented pre-TANF time limits,
African American children are found to be more likely to live with a
single parent than in a doubled-up household. Similarly, strict time limits
under TANF are associated with an increase in the likelihood that the
white children of low-education mothers (i.e., those with a high school
degree or less) live with a single parent relative to the likelihood that
they live in a doubled-up household. Time limits under TANF are also
associated with an increase in the likelihood that African American
children will live in married households. Finally, African American chil-
dren in states that implemented a generous income disregard policy
under TANF are found to be more likely to live in double-up households
than with single parents. These ﬁndings are noteworthy in that they persist
regardless of how the policy variables are coded and remain statistically
signiﬁcant in both the individual and state ﬁxed-effects models.
Taken together the ﬁndings discussed above suggest that time limits,
whether imposed before or under TANF, may increase the likelihood
that children will live with a single mother and decrease the chances
that they will live in doubled-up households. They further suggest that
African American children’s chances of living in a single-parent house-
hold may diminish if policies increase the income available to families
(i.e., increases of the income disregard or EITC beneﬁt). Perhaps dou-
bling up occurs when less fortunate family members join households as
mothers’ income increases (e.g., due to increases in the income dis-
regard). The additional income provided by an increase in the income
disregard may also make those who receive it attractive partners for
potential cohabitors (although such policies are not found to be asso-
ciated with an increased likelihood of marriage). In contrast, the pres-
ence of time limits may diminish the appeal of doubling up, as mothers
may be ﬁnancially stressed.
Complicating the understanding of these associations is the fact that
the estimated inﬂuence of various policies differs depending on the
period examined. For example, only income disregards in the TANF
period, and not those in the pre-TANF period, are estimated to have
consistent associations with African American children’s family arrange-
ments. It is not at all clear why this would be the case. In addition,
although time limits are associated with the likelihood that children live
in single-parent households, this association differs by race and by time
period, such that only time limits in the pre-TANF period are associated
with this living arrangement for African American children. In contrast,
strict time limits under TANF are associated with an increase in the
likelihood that white children with low-educated mothers (those with a
high school degree or less) live with a single mother but also with an
increase in marriage among parents of African American children. Con-
ﬁdence would be highest for results that were similar in both the pre-
TANF and TANF periods; this would indicate that implementing a par-Welfare and Children 383
ticular type of policy consistently inﬂuences living arrangement outcomes.
The fact that results differ before and after TANF implementation reduces
conﬁdence in these results, even when they are consistent across various
model speciﬁcations.
Because of the many ways in which this study differs from previous
work, it is difﬁcult to put these ﬁndings in context with other research
in this area. In ﬁnding that there are few statistically signiﬁcant and
consistent associations between welfare policies and living arrange-
ments, this study echoes the ﬁndings of Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004a,
2004b), who also use multiple SIPP panels, conduct both longitudinal
and cross-sectional analyses, and examine speciﬁc types of state waiver
policies. The few consistent ﬁndings in the current article are concen-
trated among African American children, whereas Fitzgerald and Ribar
do not perform separate analyses by race.
The current ﬁndings can also be compared to those of Bitler and
colleagues (2006), who ﬁnd that welfare waivers are associated with a
decrease in the likelihood of living with a single parent and an increase
in the likelihood of living with married parents. The current study pro-
vides evidence that time limits under TANF are associated with an in-
crease in the likelihood that African American children live in married
households. There are numerous differences, however, between the cur-
rent study and that by Bitler and colleagues (2006); these make it dif-
ﬁcult to directly compare results across the two studies. Bitler and her
colleagues use CPS data, which give them a larger sample and an ability
to separately examine Hispanic children. The CPS data also enable them
to tease out whether children in doubled-up situations live with a parent
and a cohabiting partner or with a parent and grandparent. However,
their main analysis does not distinguish among different types of welfare
policies (the authors did test speciﬁc welfare policies, including many
examined here, in some supplemental analyses, but they report no clear
pattern of results). Finally, Bitler and colleagues did not use longitudinal
data and thus do not estimate individual ﬁxed-effects models.
This study has several limitations that should be considered when
interpreting results. First, although analyses extensively examine the
robustness of the results, the sample size is smaller than would be ideal.
This is particularly true for models that subdivide the sample by race
and level of education. Second, while it is important to try to parse out
the effects of particular components of welfare policies (e.g., time limits
and sanctions), this method may not reﬂect the real effect of policies
on living arrangements if it is really the combination of policies that
cumulatively impacts people’s behavior. For instance, people’s behavior
may be affected differently if time limits were combined with work sup-
ports, child care vouchers, and income disregards than it would be if
time limits were not implemented with these supports. Indeed, this may
be one reason why ﬁndings for the pre-TANF period differ from those384 Social Service Review
for the period after TANF’s implementation. It is likely and perhaps to
be expected that experimental studies of the effects of combined policy
interventions on behavior may net different ﬁndings than studies that
seek to isolate the effects of particular policies on behavior. In addition,
it may be challenging to isolate the effect of a single policy because, for
instance, a time limit may be implemented very differently across states
or even across communities within states. These models will not capture
that variation. Finally, the reduced-form models presented in this article
provide little information about the paths through which policies inﬂu-
ence behavior. Further research is needed to help understand the causal
mechanisms underlying any observed associations.
In all, this article contributes to the understanding of the inﬂuence
on children’s living arrangements of changes that states made to welfare
policies throughout the 1990s. It examines an extensive range of state
policies and a wide set of living arrangements. It considers the robustness
of results to several alternative policy speciﬁcations and utilizes both
state and individual ﬁxed-effects models. Results suggest that most ex-
amined policies have no statistically signiﬁcant association with chil-
dren’s living arrangements. For those demonstrating associations, con-
sistent ﬁndings vary across race and across time periods in ways that are
difﬁcult to interpret. Overall, then, these results ﬁt with the larger body
of research in this area. Such research ﬁnds little evidence that state
welfare policies can inﬂuence living arrangements in ways that are large
enough or consistent enough to be detected in conventional analyses.
Given policy makers’ interest in children’s living arrangements and the
expenditure of public dollars on policies designed to affect these out-
comes, such research highlights the potential difﬁculties in using policy
tools to inﬂuence such an outcome. It also suggests the need for more
research on whether other types of interventions, perhaps at a smaller
level, may be more effective.
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1. Analysis begins in 1992 because the ﬁrst state waivers were not implemented until
the end of 1992 (Crouse 1999).
2. The 1992 panel includes 21,577 households surveyed over 10 waves from February
1992 through May 1995. The 1993 panel includes 21,823 households surveyed over 9 waves
from February 1993 through January 1996. The 1996 panel includes 40,188 households
surveyed over 13 waves from April 1996 through March 2000.
3. Thirty-nine percent of the African American child spells have a parent with more
than a high school degree, but the remaining 6,295 spells of children with less educated
parents would not provide a large enough number of spells in each outcome group across
states and years.
4. Respondent loss (at the household level) by the end of the SIPP panels was 26.6
percent for the 1992 panel, 26.9 percent for the 1993 panel, and 35.5 percent for the
1996 panel (Westat and Mathematica 2001).
5. Sample size issues preclude a separate examination of cohabiting mothers. They
represent about one-third of the doubled-up group for both African American and white
children. This means that only a handful of cohabiting mothers are represented in each
state and year.
6. The term “parent” refers to the person identiﬁed as the child’s parent (typically
mother). If the mother’s information is not available, analyses use information on the
household head. Only 29 observations have a parent whose age is over 65.
7. The TANF proportion variable is coded zero in years before the state implemented
TANF, one in years after TANF was implemented, and is the proportion of the year in
which TANF was implemented for the year that the state implemented TANF. The waiver
variables in the pre-TANF period (time limit, sanction, income disregard) are similarly
coded: instead of being coded one in the year the state implemented the waiver, they are
coded as the proportion of the year the state had the waiver in place. In the year TANF
was implemented (and thereafter), these variables were coded one in the dummy variable
speciﬁcation. In the proportion models, these waiver variables are coded as the maximum
of either the proportion of the year the waiver was in place or the proportion of the year
TANF was in place. To capture the proportion of the year a state had a strict policy in
effect in the TANF period, analyses assume that the strict policy was implemented at the
same time as TANF. Therefore, the measure of strict sanctions, for example, equals the
proportion of the year TANF was in place in the ﬁrst year that the strict policy began and
then one for each year thereafter that the policy was in place. The authors are unable to
create proportion measures for policy strictness or generosity after this initial implemen-
tation year.